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Carter H. Golembe* and Max H. Kumin**
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seri-
ously doubt that if these States should either be wholly dis-
united, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions
into which they might be thrown would have frequent and vio-
lent contests with each other.
Federalist Paper
Number 6, 1787.
[B]e it resolved by the Caucus of New England State Legisla-
tures that a Committee be established comprised of two legisla-
tors from each of the New England states. . for the purpose
of pursuing the establishment of a regional banking system in
order to strengthen the economic health and vitality of the
region.
Resolution of the Caucus
of New England State
Legislatures, 1983.
On January 7, 1985, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case of Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v.
Board of Governors.' The central issue in the litigation is whether the
Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 19562 (Act)
removes the constitutional barriers confronting states that wish to permit
interestate banking on a regional basis. The authors believe that the
Douglas Amendment does not remove such barriers, principally the
commerce and the compact clauses of the United States Constitution,3
* Carter H. Golembe is Chairman of Golembe Associates, Inc.
** Max H. Kumin was an Associate with Golembe Associates, Inc., at the time this Arti-
cle was written. He is now an attorney with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The
opinions expressed herein are the authors' alone and do not in any way represent the position
of the FDIC or its staff.
1. 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985).
2. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, is codified at 12 U.S.C. §" 1841
(1982). The Douglas Amendment appears at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
3. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (com-
pact clause).
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and further believe that federal legislation should no do so, except per-
haps on a temporary and transitional basis.4 Fundamental principles of
constitutional law dictate the first conclusion; American history and eco-
nomic analysis dictate the second.
The first section of this Article briefly describes the history of the
case. The second and third sections present the constitutional arguments
against regional interstate banking compacts under the commerce and
compact clauses. The fourth section presents a brief economic analysis
of regional arrangements, and the fifth section discusses the public policy
considerations that disfavor such arrangements.
I. THE HISTORY OF NORTHEAST BANCORP
The Bank Holding Company Act requires bank holding companies,
and companies wishing to become bank holding companies, to apply to
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) for prior
approval to acquire control of commercial banks.' Section 3(d) of the
Act-commonly referred to as the "Douglas Amendment" because it
was offered by Senator Douglas of Illinois and added just prior to the
final Senate vote in 1956-prohibits the Board from approving the acqui-
sition of a bank located in one state by a bank holding company that has
a principal place of business in another state unless the acquisition is
"specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such
bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by implica-
tion.",6 On December 30, 1982, Massachusetts enacted the nation's first
regionally restrictive interstate banking statute (the Massachusetts Act).'
The statute permits bank holding companies located in the other five
New England states (Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Is-
land and Vermont) to acquire banks located in Massachusetts if those
states extend reciprocal rights to Massachusetts bank holding companies.
Subsequently, on June 8, 1983, Connecticut enacted a similar statute,
which permits the acquisition of Connecticut banks by bank holding
companies located in the other five New England states (the Connecticut
Act).8 Since then, the states of Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Caro-
4. Golembe, Reflections on Regional Banking: The Courts, and the Congress, BANKING
EXPANSION REP., Nov. 19, 1984, at 1.
5. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982).
6. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
7. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 167A, § 2 (West 1984).
8. 1983 Conn. Acts 83-411 (Reg. Sess.). Rhode Island has enacted a similar, regional
reciprocal statute. 1983 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 201 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-30-1, 19-




lina and South Carolina have passed reciprocal legislation creating a
southeastern banking region, and it is reported that at least twenty states
will consider various forms of regionally limited interstate banking legis-
lation in 1985.
Shortly after the enactment of the Massachusetts and Connecticut
statutes, three merger agreements were concluded between Massachu-
setts and Connecticut bank holding companies.9 The companies applied
for, and received, the Board's approval of the transactions. ° The appli-
cations were protested before the Board by the petitioners now before the
Supreme Court. These petitioners are Northeast Bancorp, Inc., a Con-
necticut bank holding company, Union Trust Company, its wholly-
owned subsidiary, and Citicorp, a New York bank holding company.
Subsequently, the petitioners appealed the Board's orders approving the
applications to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, which upheld the orders."' The court held that Congress, in the
Douglas Amendment, had authorized Massachusetts and Connecticut to
enact their interstate banking statutes and consequently, that the statutes
did not violate the commerce clause.' 2 The court found that the state
statutes at issue did not violate the compact clause because they did not
"encroach upon or interfere with the supremacy of the United States."'"
The petition for a writ of certiorari followed.
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE BARRIER TO REGIONAL BANKING
In Federalist Paper Number 7, Alexander Hamilton foresaw that,
9. Bank of New England Corporation, a Massachusetts bank holding company, agreed to
merge with CBT Corporation, a Connecticut bank holding company; Hartford National Cor-
poration, a Connecticut bank holding company, agreed to acquire Arltru Bancorporation, a
Massachusetts banking holding company, and Bank of Boston Corporation, a Massachusetts
bank holding company, agreed to acquire Colonial Bancorp, Inc., a Connecticut bank holding
company.
As of December 1984, the only other definitive agreement to merge announced under
regional interstate statutes that have already been enacted has been between Sun Banks, Inc., a
Florida bank holding company, and Trust Company of Georgia, a Georgia bank holding
company.
10. Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374 (1984); Hartford Nat'l Corp., 70
Fed. Res. Bull. 353 (1984); Bank of Boston Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 524 (1984).
11. Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted,
105 S. Ct. 776 (1985). The appeals were taken pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1982).
12. 740 F.2d at 208.
13. Id. at 209 (quoting and citing United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n,
434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976); Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893)). The court also held that the statutes at issue did not
violate the equal protection clause, id. at 209-10, but the petitioners have not raised that argu-
ment before the Supreme Court and it will not be discussed there.
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absent passage of a unifying constitution, "[t]he competitions of com-
merce would be [a] fruitful source of contention. . . . Each State, or sep-
arate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar
to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions,
which would beget discontent." 14 Hamilton expressed the fears that had
been an immediate reason for calling the constitutional convention and
drafting the commerce clause, which grants Congress the authority to
"'regulate Commerce. . . among the several States.' "15
Implicit in this grant of authority is a limitation upon the power of
the states to regulate interstate commerce, as the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized at least since Cooley v. Board of Wardens. 6 The Court has
stated that the "purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of
free trade among the several States."1 7
Congress may, of course, authorize the states to regulate interestate
commerce in ways that, absent such authorization, would be inconsistent
with the commerce clause.1 Thus, the first issue in the Northeast
Bancorp case is whether, through the Douglas Amendment, Congress
has authorized the states to enter into regional banking arrangements. 19
In cases where states have claimed congressional authorization for other-
wise impermissible interference with interestate commerce, the Supreme
Court has generally looked for an express statement of congressional pol-
icy before finding that the state regulation is permissible.20 Last term,
14. THE FEDERALISTS No. 7, at 116 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
15. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
16. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
17. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
18. See, e.g., Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652-53
(1981); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-31 (1946).
19. It is clear that, absent such congressional authorization, regional arrangements would
violate the commerce clause, as the Solicitor General has conceded. Respondent's Brief
against Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 740
F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cerL granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985) (citing Lewis v. BT Inv. Manag-
ers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980)) [hereinafter Briefs cited without case name]; City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366, 370-71 (1976). When confronted with claims that state regulation affecting interstate
commerce is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has employed two tests. If the challenged
regulation is determined to be outright protectionism, a "virtually per se rule of invalidity has
been erected.'" Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (quoting City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624). If the regulation equally affects interstate and local businesses,
it may survive if "narrowly drawn." Id. The focus of inquiry is upon the probable effect of the
statute. Id. at 37.
20. See, eg., Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 653
(1981) (MeCarran-Ferguson Act). The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.), is the classic example of an express congressional statement of
such intent. Section 1 of the Act states:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
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the Court clarified this requirement, stating that:
[Flor a state regulation to be removed from the reach of the
dormant Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be un-
mistakably clear. The requirement that Congress affirmatively
contemplate otherwise invalid state legislation is mandated by
the policies underlying dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. It
is not. . . merely a wooden formalism. The Commerce Clause
was designed "to avoid the tendencies toward economic Bal-
kanization that had plagued relations among the colonies and
later among the States under the Articles of Confederation."'"
Regarding state statutes permitting interstate acquisitions on a re-
gional basis only, congressional intent as expressed in the Douglas
Amendment and the circumstances surrounding its passage can hardly
be deemed "unmistakably clear." The language of the statute simply
grants states the right to lift the federally imposed barrier to interstate
acquisitions. Not a word of the statute suggests that in acting to lift the
barrier, a state might discriminate between states it deems desirable as
trading partners and those it does not. The notion that states may con-
struct preferential trade regions and protect their citizens from competi-
tion resulting from free access to local markets has repeatedly been
rejected by the Court.22 Furthermore, while regional state statutes may
fall within the literal wording of the Douglas Amendment, it is quite
clear that they fail to pass an integral part of the test described above.
They were not "affirmatively contemplated" by Congress when it passed
the Douglas Amendment.
The Douglas Amendment was first offered on the floor of the Senate
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States.
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1982). Section 2(a) states: "The business of insurance. . . shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business." 15
U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1982). The legislative history of the statute contains an equally clear expres-
sion of congressional intent. Consequently, the Supreme Court has often held that it autho-
rizes otherwise invalid state action. Western & S., 451 U.S. at 654-55. See generally Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 425-28 (1946).
21. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2242 (1984) (quoting
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)).
22. Eg., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (state price control scheme
favoring in-state producers violated commerce clause); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell,
424 U.S. 366 (1976) (mandatory reciprocity requirement for in-state sale of milk produced out-
of-state violates commerce clause); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)
(same for geographic production requirement). See generally H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du-
Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
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and adopted after only brief debate.23 The sparse legislative history is
focused primarily on the Amendment's intended effects of preventing a
concentration of resources in banking.24 The Amendment established a
de facto prohibition of interstate banking,2" for at the time of its adoption
not a single state statute permitted the entry of out-of-state bank holding
companies.26 Nowhere did the discussion touch upon the specific issue
of regionalism, or even upon the broader issue of the fashion in which
states might choose to exercise their power under the Amendment. In-
deed, one Senator pointed out that the statute required discrimination in
interstate commerce, and left to the states the task of correcting it.2 7
Although the absence of specific discussion of the point during the debate
makes it impossible to determine Congress' actual intention, it is unlikely
that the correction contemplated was to be discriminatory itself. Such a
conclusion would reduce Congress' authority under the commerce clause
to little more than the "wooden formalism" the Supreme Court has
stated it is not, for it would allow the states to install discriminatory
trade arrangements without the scrutiny of the only body granted consti-
tutional authority to authorize them.28
The Supreme Court recently explained that the policies underlying
the dormant commerce clause doctrine require that "all segments of the
country are represented" in situations where the claim is made that
otherwise invalid state legislation has been congressionally sanctioned.
This ensures that there is "significantly less danger that one State will be
in position to exploit others."29 Observing that "[u]nrepresented inter-
ests will often bear the brunt of regulations imposed by one State. . .on
persons or operations in other States,"30 the Court stated that "[a] rule
requiring a clear expression of approval by Congress ensures. . . a col-
lective decision."31
In other words, while the proponents of discriminatory state legisla-
23. 102 CONG. REc. 6856-63 (1956). There is no committee report or other significant
legislative history.
24. Id. at 6857 (statement of Sen. Douglas).
25. Id. at 6860 (Sen. Douglas remarked: "[T]he immediate practical effect would be to bar
the expansion of bank holding companies across State lines.") See also statement of Sen.
Bricker, id. at 6861 ("an absolute prohibition against future expansion by bank holding
companies").
26. Id. at 6860 (statement of Sen. Douglas).
27. Id. (statement of Sen. Bennett). It is noteworthy that Congress has considered, and
failed to pass, an explicit federal authorization of interstate banking. S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. §§ 1001-1007, 130 CONG. REc. 11, 162-80 (1984).






tion may muster enough votes to secure congressional blessing of their
policies, the Constitution requires that the democratic process be ad-
hered to in the undertaking. The need for affirmative congressional ap-
proval is heightened by the fact that regionally restrictive interstate
banking legislation may significantly alter the nation's banking structure.
The importance of the federal government's policy objectives, discussed
below, dictates that congressional authorization of regional interstate
compacts not be implied lightly. 2
III. THE COMPACT CLAUSE BARRIER TO REGIONAL BANKING
The compact clause of the United States Constitution provides: "No
state shall, without the Consent of Congress. . .enter into any Agree-
ment or Compact with another state. . . .33 The Supreme Court has
construed the clause so as to cover all types of agreements, formal and
informal,34 that have the potential35 to increase the political power of the
compacting states or to encroach upon or interfere with the supremacy of
federal power.36
There is little question that the Connecticut and Massachusetts Acts
together constitute an "arrangement or compact" within the meaning of
the clause. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
the Second Circuit assumed so, and few of the parties have seriously con-
tested the issue.37 It is undisputed that Congress has not specifically au-
thorized the Massachusetts and Connecticut Acts, or any other regional
compact now in existence or contemplated. Hence, the principal objec-
tion to regional compacts under the compact clause is that they have the
potential to increase both the economic and political power of the com-
pacting states and impinge upon federal authority. 38 Such compacts rep-
32. Cf id. at 2243, n.7.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
34. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1978).
35. Id. at 471.
36. Id. at 472. See also New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976); Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893).
37. Appendix to the Order Approving the Application of Bank of New England Corpora-
tion to merge with CBT Corporation. 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 380 (1984); Northeast Bancorp v.
Board of Governors, 740 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985);
Respondent's Brief against Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, at 11. One month
after Massachusetts passed its interstate statute, the Caucus of New England State Legisla-
tures, the New England Governors' Conference, and the New England Congressional Caucus
jointly sponsored a conference "to explore the concept of a New England interstate banking
system." Petitioner's Brief for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, at A162-A168. Connecticut
passed its interstate statute four months later.
38. If the Court holds that the Massachusetts and Connecticut Acts violate the commerce
clause, then it need only conclude that together they constitute an "agreement" or "compact"
1985]
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resent state-initiated interference with the long-standing and overriding
exercise of federal supremacy over the nation's banking system. Conse-
quently, unless and until the existence of regional compacts is sanctioned
by Congress, they remain constitutionally impermissible.
The fact that banks are subject to the oldest and most pervasive sys-
tem of regulation applied to any industry in this nation is testimony not
only to the central role that such institutions play in the economy, but
also to the paramount concern that government has displayed in the
banking industry.39 As monetary institutions, commercial banks are the
vehicles through which the bulk of the nation's money supply is created
and held. Consequently, the government necessarily has a deep interest
in the soundness and stability of the banking system. As the primary
mobilizers and allocators of credit, banks are also subject to the govern-
ment interest attached to these functions. Over time, government has
become increasingly concerned with the uses to which bank credit is put.
In the almost two hundred years since the adoption of the United
States Constitution, no subject has excited more political emotion or
raised more sensitive issues of federal and state prerogatives than bank-
ing. It was probably for this reason that neither banks nor the business
of banking was mentioned by the drafters of the Constitution. The sub-
ject was so controversial as to raise the specter of rejection of the new
Constitution should it be addressed. Yet, in the economic and financial
system that subsequently evolved, the exercise of the monetary powers of
government and, more specifically, control of the banking system has
often raised issues of constitutional significance. This is the case today
with regional interstate banking compacts.
There has never been any question that the monetary power-essen-
tially control over the circulating medium-was and is a significant ele-
ment of government sovereignty. As Bray Hammond put it, in his
classic study of American banking: "In terms of the Constitution and of
common sense, control of the monetary system irrefragably belonged to
within the meaning of the compact clause to hold that the Acts violate that clause as well. By
recognizing that the grant of authority to Congress in the commerce clause implies a limitation
of power upon the states, see supra note 16, dormant commerce clause doctrine requires that
federal supremacy in the regulation of interstate commerce be acknowledged. Consequently,
multistate compacts that violate the commerce clause must of necessity violate the compact
clause. Cf United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978). Of
course, congressional authorization of the compact would cure the constitutional defects under
both clauses.
39. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38 (1980) ("An impressive array of
federal statutes regulat[es]. . . that provision of banking services [and] the formation of bank-
ing organizations . ").
[Vol. 18100
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sovereignty. ... " Rather, the question was where that sovereignty
lay-in the newly organized federal government or in the states. Was the
federal government a mere creation of the states, limited to the exercise
of the powers specifically granted it, while the states, remaining sover-
eign, were the holders of all powers not relinquished? Or, was the federal
government sovereign, fully capable of exercising all of the indicia of sov-
ereignty, whether explicitly or implicitly based on the words of the Con-
stitution? The first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton,
advanced the latter position when he urged President Washington to ap-
prove the chartering by the federal government of the Bank of the United
States in one of the most significant monetary events in the nation's
history:
[T]his general principle is inherent in the very definition of gov-
ernment, and essential to every step of the progress to be made
by that of the United States, namely: That every power vested
in a government is in its nature sovereign, and includes, by
force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite and
fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power,
and which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions
specified in the Constitution, or not immoral, or not contrary to
the essential ends of political society."'
It was Thomas Jefferson, among others, who took quite the opposite view
in opposing, unsuccessfully, the federal government's first entry into the
banking business, an entry probably intended to have, and certainly hav-
ing in fact, the effect of exercising control over state banking institutions.
The matter of government sovereignty and the monetary power was
not settled in 1791. Several decades later, in the early 1830's, the pendu-
lum swung quite far in the other direction when President Jackson, with
the support of agrarians and business entrepreneurs, destroyed the sec-
ond Bank of the United States. To be sure, Chief Justice John Marshall,
in Craig v. Missouri, had made it quite clear in 1830 that, under the Con-
stitution, the states could not furnish the nation's circulating medium
through the issuance of bills of credit, or by instruments similar in nature
but passing under a different name.42 His decision was thought to fore-
shadow the eventual end of state chartered banks-institutions that obvi-
ously were creatures of the states and that were, in fact, providing much
of the nation's circulating medium in the form of bank notes and depos-
40. B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 723 (1957).
41. Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, Feb. 23, 1791, in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 279 (H. Krooss ed. 1969).
42. 29 U.S. (4 Pet. 410 (1830).
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its. Yet, in 1837, after Chief Justice Marshall's death, the Supreme Court
in Briscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky held that notes
issued by state banks and used as circulating medium were not violative
of the United States Constitution.43 Because the charter of the second
Bank of the United States had expired in 1836 and was not renewed by
the federal government, Briscoe meant that, for all practical purposes, the
monetary power of the government had been lodged finally in the states,
where it resided for the next three decades.
It was probably inevitable that the pendulum would swing again,
returning to Hamiltonian doctrine. The immediate cause for this event
was the Civil War. The North entered the war without a monetary sys-
tem of its own, and indeed, with little if any control over the state bank-
ing system. It ended the war with its own banking system in place and
had set the scene for restoration to the federal government of that ele-
ment of sovereignty implied in power over the circulating medium. That
power has resided in the federal government ever since.
The federal government created its own bank system, national
banks, in 1863. During the war it issued its own currency, the so-called
Greenbacks, which the Supreme Court in 1870 found to be constitutional
in the Legal Tender Cases.' The Briscoe decision of 1837 was essentially
overturned or at least ignored in 1869 when the Court held that a prohib-
itive tax laid by Congress on state banknotes, in an effort to assure the
primacy of the federal circulating medium and to eliminate the state
banks, was constitutional.45 It would seem that even the existence of
state banks is a matter of federal grace rather than constitutional privi-
lege. A prohibitive tax on the note liabilities of state banks could be
applied as well to the deposit liabilities of the same institutions.
In any event, Congress in 1913 established a central bank and in
1933 created an agency of the federal government to insure bank depos-
its. The constitutionality of the central bank was settled many years
before, in McCulloch v. Maryland." The constitutionality of deposit in-
surance was upheld in Doherty v. United States.47
It is of interest, and of some possible significance to the issues raised
by regional compacts, that the courts have gone beyond the narrow mon-
etary clause of the Constitution to fix the constitutional locus of the mon-
43. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
44. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
45. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
47. 94 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1938).
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etary power held and exercised by the federal government. In Norman v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., for example, the Supreme Court stated:
The broad and comprehensive national authority over the sub-
jects of revenue, finance and currency is derived from the aggre-
gate of the powers granted to the Congress, embracing the
powers to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, to
coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and
fix the standards of weights and measures, and the added ex-
press power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution" the other enumerated
powers.48
It is beyond question that there are national economic goals to be
obtained by a properly functioning monetary system. The Employment
Act of 194649 legislatively declared economic goals, which were ex-
panded in the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978
(Humphrey-Hawkins Act).5 0 The latter calls upon the President, the
Congress and the monetary authority to achieve "national economic pri-
orities and objectives."'" Nor is there any question of the importance of
the banking system, and the structure of that system, to the achievement
of such goals. The Supreme Court was explicit on this point in United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank 2 when, in dealing with a significant
structural question involving the proposed merger of two Pennsylvania
banks, it stated:
Banking operations are varied and complex; "commercial
banking" describes a congeries of services and credit devices.
But among them the creation of additional money and credit,
the management of the checking-account system, and the fur-
nishing of short-term business loans would appear to be the
most important. For the proper discharge of these functions is
indispensable to a healthy national economy, as the role of bank
failures in depression periods attests.53
It is against this background that the sovereign role of the federal
government in shaping the banking structure is seen most easily. One
must begin with the manner in which the federal government has shaped
48. 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935) (citing Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 439-40 (1884)).
49. Pub. L. No. 79-304, ch. 33, 60 Stat. 23 (1946).
50. Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
51. Id.
52. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
53. Id. at 326-27 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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the present structure. As evidenced by the McFadden Act of 1927, as
amended in 1933, the federal government concluded that its own na-
tional banking institutions, as well as those state-chartered banks that
had joined the Federal Reserve System, should not operate branches
outside of the state in which each was located. 4 Then, in an awkward
effort to provide parallel treatment for those banking organizations desig-
nated as bank holding companies, Congress in 1956 enacted the Bank
Holding Company Act. The Act directed that the Federal Reserve
Board, an agency of the federal government, should not approve the ac-
quisition of a bank by a bank holding company if such bank was not
located in the state in which the holding company did its principal
business.
An incidental effect of these federal decisions was to place each state
in a position to fashion its banking structure, that is, branching or no
branching, holding company banking (one-bank or multi-bank) or no
holding company banking. To be sure, it was always understood that the
federal government could reverse this arrangement any time that it
chose, at least for its banks and its agencies. Nor were the states given
unrestricted authority over the banking structures within their own terri-
tories. The Bank Merger Act of 1966, for example, placed in the federal
banking agencies authority over bank mergers. 5 Most recently, the
Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 permitted federal agencies to arrange in-
terstate acquisitions of failing, major commercial banks.5 6
This federal statutory structure of geographic restraints on banking
is founded on a variety of motives, most of which will not pass the test of
economic analysis. These motives are, nonetheless, real, and range from
a desire to preserve the soundness of the banking system by restricting
competition to a fear of large concentrations of banking resources.
Whatever the motives, the effect of geographic restraints on the banking
structure is profound. The federal government, historically at least, has
opted for a pluralistic or fragmented banking structure by taking the ac-
tions noted above, knitting the system together through a federal pro-
54. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982).
55. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(0 (1982). Section 116(4)(i) of the Garn-St Germain Act provides
that "[n]otwithstanding section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 or any other
provision of law, State or Federal, or the constitution of any State," in the case of a failed
commercial or failing mutual savings bank, where the bank has assets in excess of $500 mil-
lion, the FDIC may arrange for its acquisition by an out-of-state bank holding company. In
selecting a purchaser, preference must be accorded possible in-state purchasers, following cer-
tain criteria set forth in the statute. If an out-of-state purchaser is selected, preference must be
accorded to those in continguous states.
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gram of deposit insurance. But these have been federal decisions,
implemented by federal law, and supervised by federal agencies.
It is this demonstrated exercise of federal authority that is en-
croached upon by regional interstate compacts which act to enhance
state power at the expense of the federal government.57
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Regional interstate compacts are clearly offensive to economic prin-
ciples. Their effect is to create a kind of "common market" for interstate
banking that benefits banking institutions within the region and penalizes
banking institutions outside the region. Compacts also harm banking
institutions within the region with businesses oriented toward excluded
states. The benefits and penalties are easily illustrated.
Absent the formation of a new banking region, bank holding compa-
nies in any state in the Union may conduct a variety of banking busi-
nesses in any other state, subject only to an inability to do a deposit
business through a bank subsidiary. Thus, for example, prior to passage
of the statutes being challenged in the Northeast Bancorp case, bank
holding companies headquartered in Massachusetts and New York were
on an equal competitive footing in Connecticut. They could do any kind
of banking or bank-related business permissible under federal and state
law, for out-of-state banks or bank holding companies, but could not
combine these activities with a deposit-taking business. Such a combina-
tion, heretofore available in Connecticut only to Connecticut banks, is a
powerful competitive tool. But with passage of the Massachusetts and
Connecticut Acts, Massachusetts bank holding companies are provided
with the new competitive tool while those in New York are denied it.
Thus, even though there may be a much closer economic relationship
between Connecticut and New York than between Connecticut and Mas-
sachusetts when it comes to local banking markets, it is the New York
bank holding companies that are suddenly placed in a subordinate com-
petitive position in Connecticut as compared with Massachusetts
companies.
In effect, the Connecticut and Massachusetts legislatures, acting in
concert, have decided that certain banking institutions will grow faster
than would otherwise have been possible, while certain other banking
institutions will grow more slowly than would otherwise have been possi-
ble. The only distintion is whether they are located within or outside of
the protected geographic area. Even within the protected area, the two
57. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978).
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legislatures have altered significantly the relative competitive positions of
banking organizations, enhancing the growth prospects of banking insti-
tutions whose markets and opportunities lie within the protected area,
and diminishing, relative to their competitors, the competitive position
and future growth prospects of banks whose markets and opportunities
are directed toward the excluded states.
The issue is broader, of course, than just the relative positions of
bank holding companies in the three named states. Wherever any group
of states decides to set up a common market and exclude some states
from that market, the effect will be to penalize the business concerns in
the excluded states. This in turn must have an adverse impact on the
economic development of the excluded states. In the design of the Amer-
ican banking system, parochial interests will likely always be an impor-
tant consideration. However, parochialism that goes so far as to
adversely affect the economic welfare of other states or the achievement
of national economic goals, obviously must be avoided.
Some proponents of regional compacts have attempted to justify
limiting interstate acquisitions on the basis of an economic affinity among
the included states, which somehow supports the exclusion of other
states.5" However, in a fundamental sense, whether or not there is an
economic affinity among several states is irrelevant. The fact that two or
more states may share some common interests or have similar character-
istics does not, by itself, justify a combination of those states to the detri-
ment of other states or the national interest. Although there are certain
rights reserved to the states, it is doubtful that unlimited control over the
banking system is one of them. Even if it were, there is not, as far as we
are aware, any such concept of "regional states' rights," particularly
when based on so nebulous a concept as regional affinity.
That the concept is nebulous is self-evident. All fifty states share
some common interests and characteristics; at the other extreme, no state
is precisely like any other. However, there are no accepted guidelines
that an economist can use to measure objectively or to evaluate regional
affinity, based on clusters of states, in terms of the business of banking. It
is for this reason that, when dealing with banking, the courts and econo-
mists alike have looked to the realities of the market when measuring the
impact of any significant structural change.
One serious effort to recognize regional banking configurations was
made by the federal government when it established a Federal Reserve
58. See, e.g., Report to the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut of the Findings
and Recommendations of the Commission to Study Legislation to Limit the Conduct of Busi-
ness in Connecticut (Jan. 5, 1983).
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district for each of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks and, in addition,
provided that the key elements of central bank authority would be exer-
cised on a district or regional basis.59 Reality, in the form of recognition
of the existence of a nationwide banking system, eventually prevailed so
that today (and for many years now) open market operations, the deter-
mination of reserve requirements, and (for all practical purposes) dis-
count rate changes are centered in the Board of Governors in
Washington. For the remaining day-to-day operational interaction be-
tween the Federal Reserve and member banks, the Federal Reserve dis-
tricts have proven useful, and in this context it is interesting to note that
several such districts embrace only portions of individual states. For ex-
ample, Fairfield County in Connecticut is not included with the remain-
der of New England in the Boston Federal Reserve District but, instead,
is in the New York District.
Political boundaries rarely are coterminous with economics or bank-
ing markets. Whether one selects a county, a state, or, for that matter, a
group of states as the area in which a financial institution may establish
offices or own bank subsidiaries, some customers will be inconvenienced.
The extent of this inconvenience and its significance will vary from one
area to another, but when one places an artificial barrier within a metro-
politan area, the impact is likely to be substantial. As Alan Grunewald
pointed out at a Federal Reserve conference on banking structure:
The banking activities of many people are restricted because
they live, shop and work in metropolitan areas divided by state
boundaries. People living in one state, but working and shop-
ping in another state cannot do business at the same bank
where they live and where they work and shop. To bank in
both places requires affiliation with at least two banks. It is not
fruitful to continue to restrict the natural development of bank-
ing markets across state lines by prohibitions against interstate
banking.
60
It has long been recognized that metropolitan areas, particularly
those encompassing parts of two or more states, merit special considera-
tion in banking structure deliberations. As a matter of fact, a half cen-
tury ago, Senator Carter Glass advocated interstate branching up to fifty
miles from the place where the parent was located.61 A quarter century
59. 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1982).
60. Grunewald, Economic Necessity for Interstate Banking, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CON-
FERENCE ON BANK STRucruRE AND COMPETITON 232, 233 (May 3-4, 1979) (Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago).
61. See S. REP. No. 584, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 16 (1932).
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later, the Commission on Money and Credit called for branching within
"trading areas" irrespective of state laws. The term trading area was
defined as "a geographical area that embraces the natural flow of trade
from an outlying geographical territory to and from a metropolitan
center."62 While these recommendations were far ahead of their time,
they quite appropriately recognized the importance of providing banking
service throughout a metropolitan area even though it happens to cross
state lines.
An example with particular relevance to the instant litigation is the
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island area, NY-NJ-CT CMSA
(Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area), which contains sections of
both Connecticut and New Jersey. In describing its delineation of metro-
politan statistical areas, the Office of Management and Budget stated in
June 1983: "The general concept underlying these definitions is that of a
geographic area consisting of a large population nucleus together with
adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and social inte-
gration with that nucleus."6 The Connecticut Act, 64 which permits a
bank holding company in Boston to acquire a bank in the state, but
which prohibits a bank holding company from New York City, where
thousands of the state's residents work, to take similar action clearly does
not benefit a sizeable segment of Connecticut's population.
In summary, regional affinity defined by political (in this case, state)
boundaries simply provides no basis for constructing a banking region.
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DISFAVORING
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
As in the case of so-calied regional affinity, it is difficult to reach
conclusions about the public interest without some frame of reference.
Perhaps the most logical approach is to consider the reasons why bank-
ing legislation is enacted and regulations are established, and to consider
how these factors are affected by the regional interstate acquisitions.
While people might disagree about specific items in any list of such fac-
tors, the Carter Administration's report on interstate banking provides a
fairly comprehensive set.65 That report cites five public policy issues
62. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MONEY AND CREDIT, MONEY AND CREDIT 166
(1961).
63. OFFICE OF INFORMATIONAL REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 1983 (June 27, 1983).
64. See supra note 8.
65. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, DEP'T OF THE TREAS., GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIONS
ON COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 12-17 (Jan. 1981). Apart from the refer-
ence to the dual banking system, a fairly similar list appears in Stanford Law Professor Ken-
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raised by interstate banking restrictions:
-Competition and concentration
-Service to local communities
-Viability of small banks
-Safety and stability of the banking system
-The dual banking system
Each of these factors is discussed briefly below. Admittedly, great
care must be taken in interpreting the results of structure-performance
studies, and we do not necessarily subscribe to the methodologies or find-
ings of all of the studies cited.
A. Competition and Concentration
Competition cannot be measured directly. One must decide what is
meant by competition and how it will be quantified for comparative pur-
poses, and one must delineate relevant product and geographic markets
in order to develop measures of concentration. As a result, individuals
may disagree about the fine points of a specific measure, test or finding.
But, two findings that are quite consistent in the available research are:
(1) freer entry enhances competition; and (2) concentration levels have
not risen significantly despite the major changes that have taken place in
banking structure in recent years. 6
Attorney General William French Smith, in commenting upon
some people's fears of the competitive effects of large banks or bank hold-
ing companies, observed:
There are, however, about 14,000 banks in the United States.
Neither market concentration nor aggregate concentration is a
serious prospect. As for cartels or mergers, the antitrust laws
themselves are sufficient to prevent any anticompetitive market
concentration from these sources without artificial regulatory
barriers.67
neth Scott's paper prepared for the FDIC in its 1980 study of state and federal regulation of
commercial banks. Scott, Interrelationships Between Federal and State Bank Regulatory Stat-
utes, in LEONARD LAPIDUS, STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
101, 101 (1980).
66. See, e.g., Savage & Rhoades, The Effect of Branch Banking in Pricing, Profits and
Efficiency of Unit Banks, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND
COMPETITION 187, 206 (May 3-4, 1979) (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago); Savage, Develop-
ments in Banking Structure, 1970-81, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 77, 82 (1982); S. RHOADES, BANKING
STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE AT THE STATE LEVEL DURING THE 1970s, STAFF STUDIES
III 7 (1981) (Federal Reserve Board).
67. Attorney General Hits Interstate Banking Restrictions as Anticompetitive, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 8, 1982, at 4, 8.
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Similarly, William F. Baxter, Former Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice, has stated:
In my view, the important benefits to be gained from the poten-
tial for increased competition if geographic restrictions are
eliminated appear clearly to outweigh any dangers of increased
concentration. Furthermore, the prevention of undesirable
levels of concentration can and should be addressed through
the antitrust laws, not through blanket prohibitions on inter-
state banking.
68
Like sentiments have been noted over the past decade by officials of the
Justice Department-Republican and Democrat alike.
B. Service to Local Communities
Numerous studies have been conducted of the lending performance
of the bank affiliates of bank holding companies. One of the most de-
tailed reviews of the results of these studies is found in a 1976 compen-
dium of banking issues compiled for the United States Senate. 9
Following a careful examination of the findings of the research in this
area, two contributors to the compendium concluded:
Virtually every study of lending by unit, branch, and multi-
bank holding company banks concludes that overall branch
banks and holding company affiliates have higher loan to de-
posit (asset) ratios. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
either branches or holding companies per se discriminate
against rural markets or small borrowers.70
Essentially, the same conclusion was reached in a detailed study of
the bank holding company movement prepared by the Federal Reserve
Board in September 1978. The Federal Reserve Monograph noted:
"The finding that subsidiaries invest a higher proportion of their assets in
loans indicates that bank holding companies more than likely extend
more credit to their local communities. '71 Also, a paper prepared in
1976 by the two Federal Reserve Board researchers who were most fa-
68. Geographic Restrictions of Bank Expansion: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 411, 414 (1983) (statement of William F.
Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division).
69. Id.
70. Davis & Fischer, The Impact of Multi-office Banking on the Availability of Credit in
Smaller Communities, in SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMM. ON BANK-
ING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMPENDIUM OF ISSUES RE-
LATING TO BRANCHING By FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 155, 181 (Comm. Print 1976).
71. THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE BANK HOLD-
ING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978: A COMPENDIUM 99 (Sept. 1978).
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miliar with the inner workings and performance of bank holding compa-
nies concluded: "Studies of [bank holding companies] have shown
conclusively, however, that their banks tend to make more credit avail-
able to the local community than do comparable independent banks."7 2
They went on to note:
Over all, the evidence suggests that the primary benefit of [bank
holding company] entry into a community hinges on the more
aggressive lending policies of BHC banks. This can be an im-
portant benefit because it means that individuals and businesses
in the community will be able to obtain more bank credit than
they would if BHC's were not present.73
And finally, research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in
1983, which examined the existing evidence in this area concluded: "The
availability of credit to locally limited consumers and businesses gener-
ally is increased, and no evidence suggests that bank holding companies
or branch banks redirect funds from less developed to more developed
markets.74
Many of the proponents of legislation to restrict entry by larger or-
ganizations express a special concern about a potential flow of local funds
into international loans and investments. While the market studies cited
did not differentiate between foreign and domestic loans, it would seem
fair to assume that the same conclusions hold because funds in general
were not being drawn out of local communities whatever the end use of
such funds may have seen. More importantly, however, critics of larger
banking organizations often overlook the fact that funds are received
from overseas customers and obtained in international markets. While
we would not wish to press this point based on the limited information
available and concede that great care must be taken in the interpretation
of all structure-performance studies, it does seem apparent that argu-
ments against the expansion of large banking institutions because of their
involvement in lending abroad are more emotional than factual.
The real issue is whether large bank holding companies are, or
would be, good corporate citizens, meeting their responsibilities in all of
the communities they serve. Existing research based on the experience of
the past offers strong positive evidence that, on balance, the bank subsidi-
aries of bank holding companies would more than meet this test. There
72. Lawrence & Talley, An Assessment of Bank Holding Companies, 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 15,
17 (1976) (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 17.
74. Eisenbeis, Regional Forces for Interstate Banking, ECON. Rv., May 1983, 24, 30 (Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
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is certainly no reason to expect that they would be less responsive to local
needs than would their competitors.
C The Viability of Small Banks
With the changing structure of the American financial system, many
banks are faced with direct competition from much larger organizations.
It is possible in this environment for small commercial banks not only to
survive but to prosper.
This question was considered separately by several researchers who
prepared papers for a special issue on interstate banking published by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in May 1983. The findings were con-
sistently positive. To quote Robert Eisenbeis of the University of North
Carolina, "[n]otwithstanding the fears of smaller banking organizations,
branching or holding company expansion appears to pose no threat to
the viability of small banks."75
The ability of small banks and/or bank holding companies to com-
pete with much larger organizations is quite apparent from market share
research. A study of New York State, for example, found "minimal im-
pact from large New York City banks' entry into upper New York state
after branching and bank holding restrictions were removed. The large
New York City banks' market penetration was modest and their compet-
itors' performance did not suffer."76
If substantial economies of scale (producing increasing amounts of a
given quality of service at a lower unit cost) or scope (synergy in produc-
ing a variety of products) existed, perhaps the above findings might have
been somewhat different. In the banking area, however, research has not
uncovered substantial economies of scale beyond relatively small banks
(say $50 million to $75 million in deposits). 77 However, there is some
indication in the literature on economies of scope that while the influx of
very large banks into a market may not cause competitive problems for
small banks, such influx can be of competitive significance to larger
75. Id. For a summary of other studies reaching similar conclusions, see Rhoades & Sav-
age, Can Small Banks Compete?, 164 BANKERS MAG., Jam-Feb., 1981, 59, 60.
76. King, The Impact of Local Entry by Large Bank Holding Companies, ECON. REV.,
Nov. 1982, 41, 43 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta). Also, on the New York experience see
similar conclusions in J. HEIMANN, REMARKS BEFORE THE ASSOCIATION FOR MODERN
BANKING IN ILLINOIS (Sept. 14, 1978); Kunreuther, Banking Structure in New York State:
Progress and Prospects, MONTHLY REV., Apr. 1976, 107, 114 (Federal Reserve Bank of New
York).
77. King, Interstate Expansion and Bank Costs, ECON. REV., May 1983, 40, 42 (Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta). See also Special Issue: Interstate Banking, EON. REV., May 1983
(Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
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banks that are already in the market-say those with more than $1 bil-
lion in deposits. In any event, there seems little doubt that most small
banking institutions can compete quite successfully with large banking
organizations.
D. Safety and Stability of the Banking System
One of the basic factors underlying the establishment of multi-bank
holding companies in the late 1920's and early 1930's was the financial
strength they could bring to areas suffering large numbers of bank fail-
ures. Companies such as Northwest Bancorporation, First Bank System
and Transamerica Corporation brought safety and stability to large num-
bers of communities. All three of these organizations have long-estab-
lished interstate banking operations with many of their bank subsidiaries
acquired directly as a result of efforts to provide banking service where it
would otherwise have been lost.
Risk is extremely difficult to quantify when one considers the opera-
tions of a banking organization. Risks may seem to be increased in terms
of one measure, yet reduced in terms of another. Nevertheless, at least
one study tried to assess the relationship between multi-office banking
and the safety and soundness of commercial banks.7" The research found
"[m]ulti-office banking authority and organizational structure did not ap-
pear to be contributing factors to the number or size of banks closed
during the 1960's and 1970's."79 These findings are important since the
study considered not only the multi-office banks themselves but their
possible impact on other banks in the state. The findings relating to this
question, however, are extremely limited. This was pointed out in a 1982
Federal Reserve study which warned: "There is no direct empirical evi-
dence or good indirect evidence showing a systematic relationship be-
tween a bank's size and its ability to control its credit risk position."80
Nonetheless, these findings have little relevance in terms of regional
interstate compacts. The issue is not whether states will have sizeable
interstate bank holding companies operating within their borders-they
do under present law. Rather, the question is whether the safety and
stability of any state's banking system would be negatively affected if it
allowed interstate bank holding companies to own banks within its- bor-
ders if the holding companies also owned bank subsidiaries outside of its
78. Lane & McCall, Multi-Office Banking and the Safety and Soundness of Commercial
Banks, 11 J. BANK RESEARCH 87 (1980).
79. Id. at 89.
80. Schweitzer & Whitehead, Bank Size and Risk A Note on the Evidence, EcoN. REv.,
Nov. 1982, 32, 33 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
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self-defined regions. Empirical research tells us nothing about this issue,
but logic and experience lead to the conclusion that the result is not
likely to be negative. Rather, risk could well be reduced through the
additional diversification.
E. Dual Banking
Stripped of its emotional baggage, the dual banking concept is sim-
ply that banks may be chartered by either the federal or state govern-
ment, and that once chartered they will operate subject to the banking
law of the chartering government and be subject to supervision by agen-
cies of the chartering government. The system is not of of water-tight
compartments. For example, state chartered banks may be, and gener-
ally are, subject to certain federal laws and supervision by federal agen-
cies. Nothing in a typical regional compact would enhance or diminish
the basic elements of the dual banking* system. However, such compacts
may infringe on federal supremacy with respect to the monetary power of
government.
F. Summary of Public Policy Considerations
An analysis of the five public policy criteria noted above indicates
that regional compacts do not serve appropriate regulatory objectives.
These considerations are summarized below:
1. Regional interstate compacts restrict entry, even though
freer entry enhances competition. There is a strong possibility
that, by limiting entry, concentration in relevant markets will
be higher than it would have been if entry by companies outside
of the compacting states were permitted. In any event, concern
over concentration is more appropriately addressed through
antitrust laws.
2. There is nothing to suggest that large bank holding compa-
nies will provide poorer quality services to the community. To
the cpntrary, studies show bank holding companies increase the
availability of credit locally, not decrease it. Criticisms based
upon international lending activities of banks which are suppos-
edly drawing needed funds from the small communities they
serve simply do not square with the facts. The critics particu-
larly ignore the substantial amount of funds obtained from
overseas sources.
3. Small banks can and do prosper in the face of competition
from large banks and bank holding companies. There are nu-
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merous illustrations of local banks competing successfully with
some of the largest banking organizations in this country.
4. There is no reason to believe that the safety and stability of
banking in any state would be negatively affected by permitting
companies with principal offices or domestic bank affiliates
outside the state to acquire banks in the state.
5. Dual banking, in its strictest sense, is neither strengthened
nor weakened by regional interstate compacts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Law and economics are not strangers to each other, but the issue
posed by regional interstate banking compacts offers one of the more fas-
cinating illustrations of the interplay between the two disciplines. For in
this instance, the resolution of an important but essentially mundane eco-
nomic problem raises constitutional questions that, among other things,
go to the very heart of federal sovereignty and to the economic issues
with which the drafters of the Constitution wrestled some two centuries
ago. Meanwhile, practitioners of the two disciplines are faced with con-
flicting and unappetizing choices.
For economists, who have long chafed at the decision by the federal
government to constrain banking markets to individual states, even a
partial dismemberment of such artificial (to an economist) barriers is
viewed as a step forward. The hope is that state compacts, even if de-
vised just in the interest of a handful of banking organizations, are but a
transitional stage in the evolution of a more rational market structure.
However, regional boundaries defined by the states are no less artificial
than state boundaries, and the states have no particular incentive or in-
terest in facilitating the development of banking markets that serve the
national, as opposed to the states', interest.
For lawmakers, the action by the states in devising regional inter-
state compacts, with exclusionary provisions directed at states with giant
banking organizations, soothes the traditional concerns of legislators
with excessive concentration of banking power. Perhaps of more practi-
cal significance, leaving the initiative to the states means that legislators
can avoid the vexing, emotion-laden issue of interstate banking. It is
tempting to act as though the federal government had washed its hands
of the issue in 1927 with the McFadden Act and, again, in 1956 with the
Bank Holding Company Act. The problem is that the states thus far
have served mainly as surrogates for the federal government in its sover-
eign exercise of the money process, and now the surrogates are in the
process of taking (or recapturing) the power itself.
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It is probably only within the framework of the Constitution that
this complex set of problems can be resolved, that the debates in Phila-
delphia in 1787 take on fresh meaning, and that the views on banking of
an Alexander Hamilton or a Thomas Jefferson once again have current
relevance. The authors of this Article believe that the Supreme Court
acted wisely in agreeing to review Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of
Governors. We hope that the resolution is one that provides for a federal
solution that will serve national, rather than parochial, interests in assur-
ing a sound, competitive, banking system.
